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ABSTRACT
The Network Neutrality (NN) debate refers to the battle over the
design of a regulatory framework for preserving the Internet as a
public network and open innovation platform. Fueled by concerns
that broadband access service providers might abuse network man-
agement to discriminate against third party providers (e.g., content
or application providers), policymakers have struggled with design-
ing rules that would protect the Internet from unreasonable net-
work management practices. In this article, we provide an overview
of the history of the debate in the U.S. and the EU and highlight
the challenges that will confront network engineers designing and
operating networks as the debate continues to evolve.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since its invention in the 1960s as a government-sponsored research
network in the U.S., the Internet and its associated ecosystem have
evolved into a key component of our global communications and
computing infrastructure (e.g., [1, 52]). Today, it comprises a com-
plex amalgam of interconnected and complementary computing
and communication network resources operating at multiple, par-
tially overlapping layers. Many of these are independently owned
and managed, but collectively they support and sustain the user
experience we associate with the Internet.
The Internet is widely recognized by policymakers around the
world as key infrastructure to support global digital transformation
processes as ever more economic and social activity moves on-line
and the range and numbers of Internet-connected devices grows.
Whereas the legacy telecommunications networks that comprised
the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) have long been
recognized as comprising essential basic infrastructure and been
subject to significant government regulation (and inmany countries,
were provided as government-owned utilities), the Internet has been
mostly unregulated. The Internet emerged as an overlay on legacy
telecommunications networks; Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
were free to design their service offerings, negotiate interconnection
agreements and manage their networks mostly free from significant
regulatory constraints.
Over time, the Internet grew in importance and last-mile ac-
cess providers of telephone and cable networks began to gradually
transform their networks into general-purpose Internet Protocol
(IP)-based broadband platforms capable of delivering a diverse array
of services, including broadband Internet access. In light of these
developments, it was believed by many that a new regulatory frame-
work would be needed to protect the Internet as an open, public
platform for access to online content and services, and a platform
for innovation. At the same time that access providers were trans-
forming into broadband platform providers, a cohort of new market
players such as content and cloud providers [66], and content de-
livery networks (CDNs) [70] have emerged as key players in the
Internet ecosystem. Much of the Internet experience now depends
on computing and networking resources contributed by firms like
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, or Akamai. Historically, these
newer players have been largely exempt from communications
regulatory oversight, while legacy telephone and cable last-mile
access providers remain subject to PSTN-era regulations that are
poorly matched to current technologies and market conditions.
The effort to craft a new regulatory framework to protect and
sustain the Internet as a public network and innovation platform
has come to be known as the Network Neutrality (NN) debate. The
NN debate is fundamentally a debate about what regulatory rules
are needed to protect Internet users and content and application
providers from unreasonably discriminatory network management
practices by broadband access service providers. In the following,
we provide an overview of the history of the debate in the U.S. and
the EU and highlight the challenges that will confront network en-
gineers designing and operating networks as the debate continues
to evolve.1 Figuring out who NN rules should apply to and what
that may mean for how traffic should be managed is a work-in-
process. Specifically, we examine how NN rules can be “bypassed”
and explain the challenges participants in the Internet ecosystem
may have in seeking to comply with NN rules that are likely to
remain ambiguous and evolving. Our goal here is to help educate
computer scientists and network engineers who may be unfamil-
iar with the regulatory history but who may increasingly need to
consider NN regulations in the design, operation, and management
of networked communication and computing resources that are
part of the increasingly complex and socially and economically
important Internet ecosystem.
2 THE ROLE OF LEGACY REGULATION FOR
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
There are certain basic infrastructures that are used by virtually ev-
ery segment of society and the economy. Ensuring universal access
to such basic, often critical infrastructure is recognized as a core
function for government. That includes such things as access to
clean water, reliable electric power, transportation grids, and basic
1In the meantime, numerous countries worldwide have adopted different versions of
network neutrality regulations [18].
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telecommunications services [35, 86]. In many countries, the na-
tional telecommunication networks (like water and electric power
grids) were historically provided via government-owned public util-
ities. In some countries, like the U.S., telecommunications networks
were provided by investor-owned, but still heavily regulated public
utilities (e.g., the Bell System).
Government provisioning and heavy regulation of basic infras-
tructure services has often been justified by the assessment that
those infrastructures constituted natural monopolies—or equiva-
lently, that it would cost more and be economically inefficient to
have the infrastructure services provided by multiple, competing
providers. However, government provisioning brings its own prob-
lems, threatening inefficiency, corruption, and distorting private
sector incentives to invest and innovate in the infrastructure and
in the markets dependent on the government infrastructures. Since
the 1960s, privatization and regulatory reform movements in many
countries have sought to transfer economic management of many
important functions from government control tomarkets, deregulat-
ing sectors ranging from air transport to electric power generation.
The belief was that the Darwinian forces of market-based compe-
tition would do a better job at directing investment, incentivizing
innovation, and driving toward greater efficiency than government
command and control regulation. This systemic trend has included
the privatization and deregulation of telecommunications infras-
tructure and services.
In the U.S., competition began to replace regulation first in the
markets for telephone equipment (1960s), then long-distance ser-
vices (1980s), and finally in last-mile local networking services
(1990s). In the EU, a similar pattern of steps was followed. By 1998,
the telecommunications sector was comprehensively liberalized.
The transition towards market liberalization did not eliminate the
need for regulation, but rather changed the ways in which such
regulatory oversight might be framed and managed. To the extent
markets are effectively competitive, they remain subject to general
competition laws and policies, the most important of which relate
to antitrust law. These address issues such as merger review and
specific instances of alleged anti-competitive behavior and may
be enforced by general competition authorities (e.g. the Federal
Trade Commission or FTC in the U.S. and similar agencies in other
countries) and via Court proceedings alleging antitrust violations of
general competition law. In addition, sector-specific regulators may
be empowered to address issues that require specialized expertise
or are of concern for a specific sector.
In the U.S., the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is
the sector-specific regulator that was established in 1934 to oversee
the regulation of telecommunications networks and services. The re-
sponsibilities of a telecommunications regulator includes ensuring
(i) consumer protection; (ii) universal access to basic telecommuni-
cation services; and (iii) effective competition wherever feasible in
telecommunications markets. To fulfil its mandate, sector-specific
regulators like the FCC rely on a portfolio of regulatory tools and
instruments, including the ability to mandate disclosure and trans-
parency rules, set price and service terms and obligations, regulate
business practices, institute subsidy programs, and convene and
manage the adjudication of disputes. The portfolio of tools and
actions includes both ex ante and ex post interventions [46, 112].
To protect other sectors of the economy, manage jurisdictional over-
laps, and prevent runaway regulatory authorities, sector-specific
regulators are themselves subject to regulatory oversight limiting
their authority. In the case of the FCC, that includes the basic leg-
islation that created the FCC (the Communications Act of 1934 as
amended), Congress which must approve appropriations and may
legislate new authority, the Courts which can interpret existing leg-
islation, and the Executive branch which has authority to appoint
the Commissioners that direct the FCC.
Similar frameworks and mechanisms exist in Europe, although
the situation is more complex since each of the member states that
comprise the European Union (EU) have more significant autonomy
and each has its own National Regulatory Authority (NRA). In Eu-
rope, there is no single sector-specific regulator like the FCC with
community-wide authority. Instead, the Body of European Regula-
tors for Electronic Communications (BEREC) serves an advisory
role with representation from each of the member-state NRAs [8, 9].
Today, the Internet has evolved into a broadband-centric ecosys-
tem and platform for innovation that is at the center of the global
transformation to a Digital Economy that includes a plethora of sig-
nificant network-related developments from 5G mobile broadband
to cloud computing, from the Internet of Things to augmented real-
ity. Broadband has developed into a general-purpose technology
that delivers an evolving range of Internet-based and non-Internet-
based (legacy and IP-based) applications [69]. Significantly, the In-
ternet has transformed from being just one of the many applications
that were overlaid on and shared the regulated telecommunications
infrastructure with the PSTN to be a core data communications
platform, which now partially supports global telephony services.
Today, telephony is just one of an evolving range of applications
that may be overlaid on the Internet. Unsurprisingly, the rise of a
broadband-centric Internet ecosystem has given rise to new chal-
lenges for the design of an appropriate regulatory framework.
In confronting the challenge of how to transition telecommu-
nications regulations crafted for a legacy PSTN for the broadband
Internet, U.S. and EU policymakers have followed somewhat diver-
gent paths. In the U.S., the transformation of legacy cable television
and telephone networks into general-purpose broadband network-
ing platforms that could offer similar arrays of video, voice and data
services, including Internet access, held the promise of duopoly
facilities-based competition in most markets. This challenged tradi-
tional notions that last-mile networks were non-contestable natural
monopolies (so-called essential facilities or monopolistic bottle-
necks [59]) that warranted strict ex ante regulations. Instead, it
opened the way toward further reliance on competition to ensure
desirable market outcomes. Consequently, the FCC embarked on a
path to gradually but aggressively deregulate broadband. By 2005,
both telephony-based xDSL and cable-modem based broadband ser-
vices were classified as "information services" and thus freed from
the stringent common-carrier regime that had been imposed upon
traditional telephony and telecommunications networks under Title
II of the U.S. Communications Act of 1934 [3, 54].
EU regulators, confronting the challenges of coordinating poli-
cies across multiple NRAs and with larger portions of the popula-
tion lacking coverage by duopoly facilities-based providers (e.g.,
legacy cable infrastructure was wholly lacking in Greece), were
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slower to deregulate broadband facilities and relied more heavily
on service-based competition [19, 78].
The divergence in regulatory approaches resulted in different
competitive landscapes in the U.S. and Europe. While end-users
in the EU could typically choose between a relatively large num-
ber of competing broadband access service providers (providing
service either using the facilities of the legacy telephone network
provider that remained regulated or cable infrastructures where
available), in the U.S., end-users’ choices of broadband providers
were more limited but included services offered over different un-
derlying facilities-based network providers which were more lightly
regulated [19, 48, 79, 102]).2
3 THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE
The emergence of NN is closely tied to the deregulation process
described above. Tim Wu [115, 116], who is often referred to as
having coined the term and narrative underlying the concept of NN,
traces the origin of the NN debate [117] to rising concerns in the
U.S. in the late 1990s that providers of access services to the public
Internet (i.e., the legacy cable and telephone companies that owned
and operated the last-mile broadband platforms) might use their
market power to interfere with the freedom of Internet users and
providers of Internet applications, content, and other services to use
the Internet, thereby threatening the openness of the Internet. From
a conceptual perspective, NN can thus be considered as an attempt
to craft a framework for the regulation of last-mile broadband in
a post-PSTN world. It shifts the focus of regulatory intervention
from mandating non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure
needed to provide competitive alternatives for broadband access to
imposing rules for how broadband access service providers manage
Internet traffic. NN regulations codify non-discrimination rules
and aim at establishing a regulatory dividing line to distinguish
between desirable, and thus permissible forms of differentiation (or
discrimination), and those forms that are considered undesirable
and should be forbidden [102].
The challenge for NN regulation is to provide a framework for
determining what constitutes reasonable network management,
or more specifically, traffic management practices in a complex
and evolving technical, business, and policy ecosystem of inter-
connected computing and network resources, applications, and
services. This challenge intersects with the challenge of ensuring
appropriate sector-specific regulation for national (and ultimately
international) communications infrastructure services.
2In the context of broadband Internet access, facilities-based (or network-based) compe-
tition occurs when end users can choose between two or more separate facilities-based
networks offering services in the same geographic market. These could be using the
same technology (e.g., multiple cable networks) but more typically use different tech-
nologies (e.g., telephone and cable network). Service-based competition occurs when
there are multiple providers of retail services, and some of these may rely partially or
fully on the wholesale network services provided by the underlying facilities-based net-
work providers. Retail-level service-based competition may occur even in the absence
of regulatory mandates requiring network operators to provide wholesale network
services, although typically regulatory mandates do exist when the network operators
are regarded as controlling bottleneck facilities. Service-based competition is comple-
mentary to facilities-based competition when facilities-based competition is feasible,
but in cases where there is no facilities-based competition, it offers the only viable
form of competition and leads to a situation in which multiple broadband Internet
access service providers can offer their services even if there is only a single physical
access network available [77, 101].
3.1 Network Neutrality in the U.S. and the EU:
The Regulatory Status Quo
NN regulations differ across jurisdictions, however, reliance on
transparency obligations to help ensure consumer protection are a
common denominator. More controversial issues relate to (i) the
scope of regulations (i.e., what type of traffic and which market
players should be subject to the regulations), and (ii) the defini-
tion of what constitutes reasonable and thus permissible network
management [102].
In Figure 1 we mark the main milestones in the history of NN
regulation in the US and EU.3 The first major step towards crafting
NN rules was made in the U.S. in 2005, when the FCC adopted its In-
ternet Policy Statement, setting forth principles intended to ensure
and protect consumers’ freedom of choice and right to access legal
content, use lawful applications, connect safe devices, and select
among a competitive selection of choices for service, application,
and content providers [38, 90]. Also in 2005, the FCC sanctioned a
regional ISP, Madison River Communications which was blocking
VoIP services in an effort to preserve the profits they obtained from
legacy voice services [36, 37].
In 2007, concerns over broadband access providers abusing their
market power were heightened when Comcast was discovered to
have been disconnecting end-user BitTorrent sessions without prior
notice in an effort to free up network resources being used by the
peer-to-peer application [39, 48, 108]. This waswidely recognized as
an unacceptable network management practice and resulted in the
FCC fining Comcast and led to the FCC’s first attempt to codify its
Internet Policy statement into regulatory rules under its first Open
Internet Order (OIO) in 2010 [40]. Because the FCC had previously
deregulated broadband services, the 2010 OIO was challenged in
U.S. Courts which eventually struck down major provisions of
the rules in 2014 [48]. In 2015, the FCC issued a new OIO [41]
that largely mirrored the earlier OIO but relied on reclassifying
Broadband Internet Access Services (BIAS) as a telecommunications
service that was subject to the same Title II legacy regulations that
broadband had previously been exempted from, thereby addressing
the earlier Court’s reasons for striking down the 2010 OIO. With
the election of President Trump in 2016, the FCC under the newly
Republican-appointed chairman, rescinded the 2015 OIO in their
2018 Order [42], prompting a number of States to enact their own
versions of OIO. This resulted in another wave of legal challenges
that have culminated in a seminal decision by the D.C. Court of
Appeal, which largely upheld the 2018 Order [48, 110].
Meanwhile in the EU, a similar pattern of steps were followed,
although in the EU the deregulatory pressure was less acute, in part
because facilities-based duopoly competition among BIAS providers
was less extensive and because EU member states have generally
been more accepting of government regulation than the U.S. The
EU adopted a revised Regulatory Framework for Electronic Com-
munications in 2009. A declaration on NN was published, but the
proposed means to ensure NN were based on transparency obli-
gations and the possibility to impose “safety net”-style minimum
Quality of Service (QoS) standards by NRAs [30, 31].
3For a more detailed overview of these milestones, see [101].
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Figure 1: The History of Network Neutrality Regulation: (top) in the U.S. and (bottom) in the EU.
Major steps were to be made in anticipation of, and arguably
responding to, undesirable trends towards regulatory fragmenta-
tion as indicated by the NN laws that were passed in the Nether-
lands and Slovenia in 2012 [78, 80], the European Commission (EC)
issued a proposal for regulation that contained elements of NN
regulations in 2013 [32]. After several further years of debate, the
European Commission, the Parliament, and the Council reached a
consensus which paved the way for the adoption of Regulation (EU)
2015/2120 [33]. In many respects, this regulation revealed strong
similarities with the approach taken by the FCC in their 2015 OIO.
In 2016, BEREC adopted guidelines for the implementation of NN
regulation within EU member states [5]. On November 28, 2019,
BEREC closed a public consultation to inform a revised version
of its NN Guidelines [10–12]. A reassessment is under way and
a revised second version of the BEREC guidelines is expected by
2020. Meanwhile, the European Electronic Communications Code
(EECC) has stipulated that broadband Internet access should be a
universal service via Directive (EU) 2018/1972 [34, 102].
3.2 Network Neutrality Rules in Practice
As noted above, NN rules have typically focused on the traffic
management practices employed by BIAS providers. For example,
paragraphs 104 to 108 of the 2015 OIO [41] in the U.S. required
BIAS providers to adhere to three bright-line rules and a business
conduct standard that included prohibitions against:
•Blocking of lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful
devices
• Throttling on the basis of content, applications, services, or
devices
• Paid prioritization
• Unreasonable interference or disadvantage to consumers’
and edge-providers’ access to the open Internet
In addition, the 2015 OIO imposed transparency requirements
on BIAS providers to disclose to consumers and edge providers
their network management practices ([41], para. 109). It is notewor-
thy that these rules did not prohibit BIAS providers from offering
multiple tiers of service, with different peak data rates, data caps,
and pricing terms. In prohibiting the blocking of lawful content or
applications, the rules explicitly exempted network management
practices designed to address digital piracy or access to prohibited
content such as child pornography. In prohibiting non-harmful
devices, the NN rules also intended to exempt traffic management
practices directed at stopping malware or denial of service attacks.
Also, in blocking paid prioritization, the rules did not apply to “rea-
sonable network management” practices that might result in traffic
prioritization to facilitate efficient sharing of network resources
during (transient) states of congestion which might include the
prioritization of packets for delay intolerant application traffic (e.g,
VoIP) over delay tolerant application traffic (e.g., email).
3.3 Ambiguity of NN Regulation
The two biggest challenges that NN regulations confront relate to
(i) determining the scope of regulations, i.e., what type of traffic and
market players should fall under the regulation, and (ii) the defini-
tion of what constitutes reasonable and thus permissible network
management [102], see Figure 2.
Addressing these challenges is complicated by the fact that NN
rules are inherently ambiguous. First, NN regulation is targeted at
protecting the (public) Internet. As such, it does not apply to all IP-
based traffic. There are many IP networks operated by enterprises,
service providers, and others that are not part of the public Internet,
and even when they interconnect with the public Internet, not all
of the traffic that is carried is public Internet traffic. As Lehr et
al. [69] have shown, it is far from clear what is meant by “the public
Internet.”
Second, despite the obvious fact that the experience of Internet
users might separately and interactively be shaped by a host of
factors and entities that are involved in the end-to-end delivery of
Internet traffic, the rules do not apply equally to all entities. Instead,
NN rules have focused on regulating broadband access platform
providers and their provision of BIAS. Only BIAS traffic is subject
to the rules, not other IP traffic or services that may be carried via
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Figure 2: Network Neutrality Regulation: Complexity and Ambiguity.
the broadband networks. This other traffic is usually referred to as
specialized services [102].4
Third, NN rules differ with respect to the precise requirements of
what constitutes acceptable traffic management. Although the gen-
eral intent of the NN rules is similar across jurisdictions—to enforce
a degree of egalitarian treatment of Internet traffic—the actual rules
differ with respect to who the rules apply to and precise guidance
on their interpretation is often lacking.5 Such ambiguity contributes
to regulatory uncertainty, but is partially by design. The laws that
enfranchise regulatory authorities and the rules promulgated by
regulatory agencies are designed to be sufficiently flexible to allow
context specific factors to be considered and to provide scope for
changing technology, markets, and industry/business structures.
Often, the regulators are less informed about the details of specific
networking situations or technologies than are the engineers and
business decision-makers who own and operate the networks. Reg-
ulators want to allow scope for market participants to experiment
and innovate, and to earn appropriate rewards (profits) for their
innovative activities. The Internet experience is enhanced for all
when networking resources can be shared efficiently, malware and
harmful traffic can be blocked, and a multitude of heterogeneous
applications and services can harmoniously co-exist. Thus, allowing
for innovation in network management practices is also important.
A lot of the innovation within the Internet ecosystem—from the
edges to the core, from the fundamental physical layer transport
technologies (fiber optics, wireless) to higher-level applications
support and content delivery networking and the design of client
applications—have evolved and contributed to enhancing the In-
ternet experience. Much of this involves employing complex traf-
fic management techniques that might be construed as network
management. However, many of the same techniques that may be
4The term “specialized services” is used in the U.S. and the EU to refer to services
that are not identified as (B)IAS. Some of these may be regulated under different
frameworks, e.g., [48]. In the U.S., these services have also been called non-BIAS data
services (see also Section 4.1).
5For example, it is not clear whether reasonable network management rules should be
interpreted as permitting practices which are not explicitly prohibited or prohibiting
practices which are not explicitly permitted.
employed to enhance the Internet experience might also be used
to impair it either selectively (to harm particular end-users, edge
providers, or applications) or more generally (result in an over-
all degradation of the open Internet, potentially to direct traffic
to non-Internet services and networks). Unfortunately, given the
complexity of what constitutes network management in today’s
Internet ecosystem, translating general frameworks such as the
2015 OIO rules or Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 [33] into unambigu-
ous and consensus-based rules that might be followed and enforced
by network engineers operating the networks that support and
contribute to the Internet is not feasible. What constitutes “reason-
able network management” is simply not amenable to a static and
unambiguous codification into rules that do not allow scope for
contextual interpretation.6
4 NETWORK NEUTRALITY LOOPHOLES
NN regulations and their inherent ambiguity give rise to a number
of “loopholes” by which the intent or effect of the rules may be
bypassed or undermined, see Figure 3. In the following sub-sections
we highlight a variety of methods that might be used to render NN
regulations less effective, or worse, counterproductive with regards
to their intended goal of protecting the public Internet and ensuring
reasonable network management. Since many of these “loopholes”
accelerate content delivery and improve end-user experience [117],
were a revised NN framework to eliminate those loopholes, the
end-user experience might suffer.
4.1 Specialized Services
One of the first loopholes arises because NN rules apply to BIAS
traffic, but not to other IP traffic classified as “Specialized Services”
6For example, consider the ambiguity in NN rules when applied symmetrically to fixed
and mobile broadband. In light of the fact that congestion or availability problems
are more likely to arise in the context of wireless mobile broadband services and
because mobile telecommunications regulations have not been fully harmonized with
fixed telecommunications regulations, mobile BIAS is often afforded greater scope for
engaging in network management practices that might be prohibited in the case of a
fixed provider.
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 5 Volume 50 Issue 1, January 2020
ISP 1
Private Server Cluster 
(Private IP/Address of ISP1)
End-User 1
Content 
Provider
Public Server Cluster 
(Publicly announced IP Address; 
collocated at IXP or Datacenter)
PNI
Private Server Cluster 
(IP Address not publicly 
announced)
ISP 2
End-User 2
IPX
Bilateral 
Peering
3rd Party DNS
ISP DNS
User 
Browser
Physical links
‘Traditional’ Private Networking
Public Internet Traffic
IPX: Internet Protocol Exchange
IXP: Internet eXchange Point
PNI: Private Network Interconnection
Network node
Innovative Private Networking
Key:
IXP
Figure 3: Loopholes for circumventing Network Neutrality regulation.
that are delivered via the same last-mile access networks. ISPs wish-
ing to circumvent NN rules may strategically label IP traffic so that
it is not identified as public Internet BIAS traffic, thereby effectively
exempting such traffic from application of the NN rules. Special-
ized services or non-BIAS data services are typically provided via
‘closed’ or ‘private’ IP networks (‘private’ server clusters that serve
only the users of an ISP). These networks can be customized to
support the optimized delivery of specific QoS-sensitive applica-
tions, e.g., IPTV, facilities-based VoIP, or VoLTE. The reach of these
services can vary. While IPTV services are inherently local and
provided by an ISP exclusively for its customers, the provision of
VoIP services requires universal connectivity. As described in [25],
IP-based voice services might be carried via private networks using
application-specific interconnection points like the Internet Proto-
col Exchange (IPX). The customization enables the ISP to provide
service qualities that could not be achieved via a regulated BIAS and
might involve using logically separated network capacities and/or
different types of traffic management practices [5].
The bifurcation into a public Internet and non-public IP net-
works establishes a regulatory split that requires a clear dividing
line to determine what the public Internet is, but also where it
ends and private (non-Internet) networking begins. Making such
a determination, however, presents a difficult challenge [60, 69].
Uncertainty regarding the regulatory treatment of differentially
labeled IP traffic (as Internet or non-Internet) contributes to reg-
ulatory uncertainty and may create opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage. ISPs might argue that, from a technical perspective, the
“public Internet” should be defined as comprising all IP prefixes
that are advertised to all networks (i.e., ASes) using the BGP-based
routing system. If this definition is accepted, then IP networks that
advertise prefixes only to a subset of prefixes and carry traffic via
routes that are not advertised via the BGP protocol do not pro-
vide Internet connectivity. Therefore, they could be considered as
non-Internet specialized service networks.
Many edge providers have moved their front-end servers—and
thus content, applications, and computation capabilities—closer to
end-users (or things). This may be done to economize on transport,
avoid congestion points, and improve latency performance. These
servers often communicate to back-end servers in datacenters via
private network links [23, 44, 70, 92] rather than via the public
Internet. Large content providers have invested in their own private
backbone to interconnect their datacenters and, thus, avoid the
public Internet [56, 98]. Also, specific 5G-based use cases rely on
network slicing and local processing of data in edge clouds [68,
122]. In many instances, communicating endpoints are positioned
within the same network (i.e., AS). 7 As the traffic between relevant
endpoints is thus confined within the borders of a single AS, it
constitutes an intra-network service that might be considered as
private networking. The routing of traffic to a front-end server
that is owned by the access ISP or a third party and hosted on the
access ISP’s network may also be carried via a private IP network.
Arguably, such services may not be dependent on BIAS and may
not be regarded as part of the public Internet, thereby exempting
them from NN rules.
NRAs might challenge such practices if they determine that the
only purpose of such strategies is to circumvent NN rules. However,
reaching such a finding would require a context dependent inquiry
with an uncertain outcome since clear delineation criteria for classi-
fying traffic as BIAS or specialized services do not yet exist. In view
of the dynamic nature of service provision and rapid ecosystem
evolution, static criteria for delineating between BIAS and special-
ized services will be unlikely to keep abreast of the changing nature
of the public Internet. Additionally, care must be taken as efficiency
and performance might both suffer if the specialized services used
to support content delivery were not permitted.
4.2 Content Redirection
By somemeasures, CDNs are currently responsible for about 80-90%
of the traffic that is delivered to residential users [65, 91]. The link
7Deploying servers inside an ISP network to deliver content or applications render
end-to-end communications an intra-network service, bypassing the “public Internet”
and providing possibilities for regulatory arbitrage [69, 103]. For example, Akamai [85],
Google Global Cache [51], or Netflix Open Connect [83] pursue such highly distributed
CDN strategies. These deployments often use ISP-owned address space [15, 17, 106].
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between CDNs and NN has been examined in several publications,
e.g., [29, 81, 103, 113, 121]. Highly distributed CDN and (edge) cloud
computing approaches help to bring content, applications, and
general cloud capabilities (e.g., data processing) closer to end-users.
When it comes to server deployment strategies, CDN paradigms
vary considerably. While some approaches rely on datacenters
that consist of large server farms that are strategically deployed at
central communication hubs like Internet eXchange Points (IXPs),
highly distributed approaches rely on server deployments within
ISP networks. While an overview of the different approaches is
provided in [103], intra-ISP deployments eliminate performance
bottlenecks at interconnection points, and problems related to cross-
domain routing [23, 70]. The latency between end users and a cache
inside an ISP is low, sometimes as low as a few msecs [92, 109] in
metropolitan areas. End user connections are typically terminated
at the front-end CDN server and a second connection is established
by the front-end server to other CDN servers, i.e., front-servers act
as a reverse proxy [44, 85]. In this way, CDNs can innovate and
roll out new protocols to accelerate content delivery, by relying
on server-to-server communication without requiring any updates
from the clients.
Content redirection using CDNs enables a variety of selective
redirection strategies that provide additional means for delivering
potentially discriminatory services, without engaging in discrimi-
natory traffic management. End-user requests for a specific piece
of content or a website can be redirected in a strategic fashion so
that the Quality of Experience (QoE) can be varied considerably,
even though there is no differential treatment in the transmission of
different packets or flows through the network(s). Via the Domain
Name System (DNS), the content source can be chosen in a biased
fashion. For example, an end-user request can either be matched
with a lightly utilized or a congested server. Similarly, it can be
redirected to a server that is close or to one that is distant from the
requesting end-user’s location. In the past, end-users heavily relied
on the DNS service provided by their ISPs, and their requests were
mapped accordingly [62]. Today, third-party DNS services, e.g., by
edge providers like Google DNS or OpenDNS [93], have been gain-
ing in importance. Extended DNS (EDNS) can improve mapping
between end-users and CDN servers and is supported by some
of the larger CDNs [22]. CDNs may also redirect user requests to
servers to achieve their own performance and cost objectives [85].
While these recent developments imply that ISPs might to some
extent lose control over the DNS, ISP-CDN collaboration schemes
have been proposed and are currently being implemented [91] to
improve the coordination between ISPs and CDNs, resulting in a
win-win situation for both parties, as well as enhancing the end-
user experience.
4.3 Routing and Interconnection
The choice of routing can also be used in a variety of ways to bypass
NN regulations. These include routing traffic via private intercon-
nections, manipulation of the route chosen for inter-domain routing
(e.g., to differentially select interconnection routes that are more or
less congested), or other forms of selective IP-based routing.
Private Interconnections. As explained in previous sections,
content hosted on the public Internet and traffic that may eventu-
ally be delivered via BIAS may traverse private networks for part or
most of its path from source to destination. Private interconnection
points involve the physical interfaces (Private Network Interconnec-
tions) that connect different networks, allowing them to exchange
traffic. The capabilities and arrangements governing these intercon-
nects can vary widely. They may take place at co-location facilities
where interconnecting ISPs, large content providers, or clouds [119]
maintain the interconnects, at data centers, or at IXPs. While rang-
ing widely in capacity, they can reach up to tens of Gbps for each
individual connection [16]. The private interconnections typically
rely on reserved/private IP addresses for the router interfaces; these
addresses are not advertised in the public routing system for se-
curity reasons and to preserve IPv4 address space. While in the
U.S., interconnections are often negotiated as customized bilat-
eral agreements, in the EU, a significant fraction of the ISPs use
“public peering”—i.e., peering across a Layer 2 shared switch fab-
ric [21, 49]—to interconnect with and receive traffic from content
providers [94, 114]. Internet interconnections have remained widely
unregulated, which has resulted in an evolving range of agreement
types encompassing peering, transit, paid peering, partial transit,
and a variety of other arrangements. The management of private
networks and private interconnections are not part of the public
Internet. Thus, the management of traffic at those interconnection
points has not been subject to NN regulations.
Peering and Congestion. Unresolved coordination problems
between interconnecting parties might result in situations where
degradations in the end-user QoE occur as ISPs strategically (un-
der)invest in interconnection capacity. In the past, interconnection
tussles between major ISPs in the U.S. and Netflix had gained public
attention [58, 73, 100]. Broadly speaking, ISPs had tried to induce
Netflix to accept paid peering arrangements by refusing or strategi-
cally postponing the expansion of interconnection capacities called
for by the significant increase in asymmetric traffic associated with
BIAS subscribers watching Netflix content (i.e., downstream from
Netflix servers to broadband subscribers, with relatively little traffic
flowing in the opposite direction). The result was prolonged periods
of inter-domain congestion and the degradation of end-user QoE.
It also may have motivated the FCC to consider interconnections
in their 2015 Order (at least on an ex post case-by-case basis) [78].
Congestion arising from such business disputes over who should
pay for the increased investment necessitated by growing traffic
loads can hardly be considered as a specific network management
practice. As such it seems questionable whether such strategies
would fall under the scope of NN rules.
Selective IP Routing Policies. Similar to the selective redirec-
tion strategies described in Section 4.2, a host of strategies and
tools for intra- and inter-domain traffic engineering enable the
implementation of selective routing policies. While these might
be used to optimize network utilization and performance dynami-
cally, to accommodate changing mixes of application traffic with
heterogeneous QoS requirements, the inherently selective nature
of such techniques may be used or abused to achieve all kinds of
service differentiation. For example, some IP prefixes of servers
may be announced or routed differently than others. IP routing
provides the means to control the length of the path packets have
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to travel within a network or across networks. Especially when this
involves transit traffic, this might have a significant impact on end-
to-end latency levels. To achieve better performance, prefixes can
be aggregated or de-aggregated either via BGP, e.g., [63], or via pro-
grammable networks, e.g., SDN and P4 [53, 94, 118]. Corresponding
differentiation practices will likely not be considered a violation of
current NN rules that focus on how packets are managed by the
routers since there is no differentiation between packets within the
routers along the path; instead, packets are delivered via different
paths—and there might be good reasons for that.
4.4 Middleboxes and Edge Control
A last set of loopholes we describe below is associated with (i)
using traffic management via in-network “middleboxes”; (ii) inno-
vative strategies to gain control over and optimizing the behavior
of communicating endpoints; and (iii) endpoint-based incentive-
compatible prioritization strategies.
Middleboxes and Virtual Network Functions. Middleboxes
are devices that are deployed within networks and positioned be-
tween communicating endpoints. They can be used by ISPs to
enable a wide range of functionality. For example, they may be
used for deep packet inspection (DPI), as traffic load balancers, or
to implement traffic policing strategies. The scope and flexibility of
the implementation of such tools have expanded dramatically with
the shift towards programmable networks. Advances in networking
technologies enhance the agility, customizability, and adaptability
of network management and yield dynamic control over network
resources and functions and make it feasible to customize and
deploy such tools and (virtual) network functions on-demand any-
where [45, 105]. Middleboxes and virtual network functions provide
ISPs with powerful tools for traffic engineering [97]. Much of this
can be used to the benefit of end-users and may, in many cases, be
partially under end-user control. Intelligent use of these tools can
optimize the use of network resources, enhance the user experience,
and contribute to network security and reliability. Despite their
virtues, these tools may also be used to implement ad hoc discrimi-
nation that may favor some users over others or otherwise interfere
with end-user preferences for how their traffic is managed [24]. The
rise of programmable network functionality increases complexity
and adds to the difficulty regulators confront in monitoring traffic
management practices [97]. The strategic location of such mid-
dleboxes and their associated network functionality can impact
whether they are upstream or downstream of BIAS services and
whether they are subject to NN regulations. It is challenging to
detect the existence of such devices, although measurement work
has shown that crowdsourcing techniques can detect where mid-
dleboxes may be deployed [55, 111].
Taking Control of Both Ends. An interesting, but perhaps
lesser-known, means to introduce traffic differentiation can be
achieved by gaining control over both communicating endpoints.
If end-users request content from a Google-owned server via a
Chrome(-based) browser, the behavior of communicating endpoints
is effectively controlled by the same entity: Google. This may enable
Google to deliver the requested content from a Google front-end
server that is positioned close to the requesting end-user, thus
reducing the reliance on the “public Internet”, and may take ad-
vantage of innovative protocols such as QUIC [64, 67] that can
optimize end-to-end communications ‘on top’ of the Internet. Ap-
plications in smartphones may benefit similarly by interacting with
special servers, e.g., Google’s Youtube and the various applications
of Facebook. Similarly, based on java script, Netflix can optimize
the delivery of their content. A recent development is DNS over
HTTPS [14] where the DNS requests are sent directly to the CDN
bypassing the ISP DNS. In this case the CDN knows the origin of
the request and optimizes the reply that is sent to the end-user.
With client-server coordination, it is also possible to achieve higher
throughput by establishing multiple connections with the same
server or with different servers [72], as well as by utilizing multiple
paths [88] to download the content. The techniques described above
provide means to achieve traffic optimizations and differentiation
without impacting NN rules.
Endpoint-based Incentive-compatible Prioritization.While
NN regulations aim to prevent consumer harm by prohibiting ISPs
from unreasonably applying network management practices, a dif-
ferentiation that reflects end-user preferences and relies on end-user
control can hardly be considered harmful. In this context, the study
presented in [120] provides meaningful insights. It demonstrates
that end-users have an incentive to request preferential treatment.
By analyzing demand requests of users in more than 160 homes, the
study shows that the individual user profile is heavy-tailed and that
the ranking of applications differs across different users. End-users
may want to prioritize different applications over others. Based on
these insights, the same study introduces and evaluates a simple
yet effective mechanism that enables end-users to reveal their pref-
erences based on a price and QoS differentiation scheme, which can
lead to a win-win situation for the network providers, users, and
content providers alike. For a network economic analysis showing
the benefits of incentive-compatible price and QoS differentiation
strategies, see [60].
5 NETWORK NEUTRALITY MEASUREMENTS
For NN regulations to effectively constrain behavior, it has to be
credible to all relevant industry participants that violations can
and will be detected and enforced appropriately. If expected false
positive or false negative errors are too frequent, then NN regu-
lations will either be ineffective or distort efficient behavior. The
latter might manifest itself in inefficient resource usage but also in
distorted investment decisions and innovation incentives [4, 102].
Even when QoE impairments can be reliably detected, it is difficult
to determine what the cause was or who should be held respon-
sible. The end-to-end delivery chain is often complex, potentially
involving a host of traffic management strategies employed simul-
taneously by different (competing) entities [104]. Crowd-sourcing
measurement methods, e.g., speed tests by content providers such
as the Netflix ISP speed index [82] and the Google Video Qual-
ity Report [50] may be able to identify that service degradation
has occured and yet be unable to pinpoint the root cause of the
performance degradation. Also measurements that aggregate the
performance at the level of regions do not preclude individual per-
formance experiences varying significantly. Other crowd-sourcing
methods may be able to infer some types of ISP traffic management
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practices, e.g., Netalyzr [61] and Haystack [13], yet fail to be able to
demonstrate that a NN violation has occurred. Recent measurement
work has also shown that many of the performance inefficiencies
that are experienced are due to the inherent design or interactions
of the protocols and systems involved, e.g., DNS [99] or even the
home router [107] rather than because of traffic management prac-
tices. Thus, attributing all impairments in end-user QoE to NN
violations is certainly a gross oversimplification and will often be
wrong.
Assuming in a specific case the NN regulations prohibit blocking,
throttling, paid prioritization of content as well as unreasonable in-
terference or disadvantage access to consumers and edge providers
(see Section 3.2), then in that case, to be able to identify all the above
NN violations, it is imperative to have access to all the routers and
middleboxes along the path. Such access is not scalable; many
routers/middleboxes across a path are operated by different entities
and modern routers have multiple queues. Additionally, granting
measurement access to routers/middleboxes for ISPs (even via an
application programming interface) would pose a significant secu-
rity challenge that if not appropriately addressed could jeopardize
the operation of the network.
In contrast to this, blocking of lawful content ought to be rela-
tively easy to detect. For example, OONI [87] faciliates inferring
different types of censorship blocking of content. The detection of
throttling and paid prioritization, however, presents a much more
difficult challenge. Managing stochastic traffic in a complex net-
work of networks involves decisions by many parties that jointly
contribute to determining the realized QoE. Disentangling the effect
of particular actions is difficult and usually depends on observing
traffic data over longer periods of time. Moreover, persistent impair-
ments are easier to detect8 than those that are of short duration and
episodic. Measurement techniques based on statistical inference
have been proposed to allow identification of traffic differentiation
in the Internet [47, 76, 123] and in mobile data networks [71, 96].
However, it is very challenging to validate whether traffic differ-
entiation strategies violate NN. They might as well constitute rea-
sonable network management, adapting to current network con-
ditions or reflecting application requirements or end-user device
capabilities. In this context, comparing end-user experiences across
different providers for the same application/service might prove
useful in detecting NN violations.
For specific protocols it is possible to reliably detect throttling
via measurements. For example, Glasnost [28] was able to detect
cases of BitTorrent throttling by ISPs, some involved the reset of
TCP connections. However, it is challenging to design generic tech-
niques and tools to reliably infer unreasonable interference with,
or disadvantage of, specific end-users, edge providers, or applica-
tions. One of the key problem here is to define the right metrics
to measure. Coming up with an appropriate measurement regime
is complex for a number of reasons. Beyond purely technical chal-
lenges, the economics and regulatory approach might vary across
different jurisdictions. Moreover, given the rapid pace with which
the ecosystem evolves, ensuring NN presents a moving target.
8For example, see the work on inferring persistent congestion [20, 27, 73].
While some of the strategies to manage traffic may involve the
use of the loopholes we discussed above, identifying that a particu-
lar entity has employed a particular network management strategy
does not unambiguously indicate which party may have been re-
sponsible for the QoE impairment. While loopholes may be used
to enhance customer QoE or lower costs, they may also be used to
express market power (e.g., by raising rivals costs or inducing more
favorable bargaining outcomes by participants with such power).
As a consequence, the ability to measure traffic performance from
multiple perspectives (end-to-end) and along portions of the path
is essential to reliably diagnose the source of impairments. Effect-
ing such measurements requires coordination and sharing across
multiple entities. This presents a challenge. Firstly, providers are po-
tentially competing. Secondly, they can be expected to want to avoid
being identified as the guilty party (whether rightly or wrongly).
Recent studies propose measurement techniques to improve trans-
parency [84, 89], but more work is needed in this direction. Despite
the efforts made by the FCC in the context of their Measuring Broad-
band America initiative [43] and by BEREC [2, 6, 7] to develop
appropriate third-party measurement tools, these are yet to pro-
duce the desired levels of transparency. Current regulations do not
require ISPs to provide access to the information and measurement
vantage points that are needed to evaluate whether traffic is being
managed in ways that are consistent with the goals of NN rules
or not. To date, we are aware of only a single case where an ISP
was required to provide partial access to router data to independent
experts. The mandate was imposed to ensure compliance with the
requirements of AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner [26].
6 THE FUTURE OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY
REGULATION
As we explained in previous sections, the QoE does not depend
solely on the traffic management practices of broadband access
providers nor even how traffic is managed on the public Internet.
A variety of mechanisms to enhance delivery performance (e.g.,
the emergence of CDNs) were developed and are in use to protect
against malware, enhance reliability and security, and lower net-
work costs. They bypass or augment traditional Internet services
and hence are not addressed by existing NN regulations. In most
cases, these mechanisms were developed in response to deficiencies
in the basic Internet “best-effort” service model and the needs of
more demanding applications and usage scenarios. The need for
these enhancements and even more extensive capabilities to sup-
port ever-more-demanding QoE applications and a wider-range of
QoE needs is likely to grow as we transition to next-generation
5G/6G wireless broadband networks. The growing importance and
diversity of (distributed) cloud and edge-based capabilities as well
as the future role of the IoT, the complexity and heterogeneity of
applications and usage environments, and subsequently of network-
ing requirements with regard to aspects like performance, security,
reliability, mobility, or energy-efficiency will continue to expand.
Not only will these developments further shift and blur the bound-
aries between network edges and cores, but also between what is
perceived as private and public networking.
Regulatory strategies that focus too narrowly on a single net-
work service such as Internet access service, while ignoring other
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networks or network services that may be used in conjunction with
or as substitutes for Internet services will risk being irrelevant with
respect to their ability to impact end-users QoE or how traffic is
actually managed. Additionally, those same mechanisms that may
be used to augment and enhance the QoE of Internet access may
be used to bypass narrowly focused NN rules that focus on specific
services, management practices, or market participants.
The goal of NN regulations is to protect an open Internet and
ensure a good QoE for users, and meeting that challenge in the
dynamic and evolving Internet will require a NN framework that
is capable of adapting to changing market and technology trends.
This will include identifying either implicitly or explicitly the mini-
mum standard of performance that should be delivered from basic
Internet access services to meet the fundamental goal of NN reg-
ulations. In addition, regulators will need an evolving framework
for determining how traffic management practices should be con-
strained and which market participants are subject to those traffic
management constraints.
Recently, NRAs and other stakeholders have made efforts to re-
assess the regulatory status quo. A recent document by the Internet
Society [57] recognized that NN rules that fail to account for the
role of edge providers like CDNs, specialized services, (dynamic)
routing adjustments and other in-network mechanisms for impact-
ing QoS are unlikely to impose any effective regulatory restraint.
In the EU, the recent draft of BEREC’s revised NN guidelines [12]
indicates a tendency toward granting NRAs more control over all
services offered via the broadband platforms of access ISPs. This
tendency would imply returning to the sort of control NRAs had
over PSTN providers and relying more on ex post enforcement on a
case-by-case basis rather than ex ante specific rules. In the U.S., the
situation is different and less certain. Currently, there seems to be
a tendency to be more de-regulatory but also to rely increasingly
on ex post (case-by-case) enforcement. This reflects a recognition
that flexibility of network management and diversity of practices
that can be used to enhance quality and efficiency makes it difficult
to identify specific practices that should be explicitly prohibited or
alternatively should be explicitly mandated. For markets, this may
be appropriate since it leaves discretion for variation in practices
with guidelines that can be enforced when flagrant violations occur.
While a partisan divide and changing majorities within the FCC cre-
ate uncertainty about the regulatory stance towards NN regulation
in general, it is currently unclear how Federal and state authority
to regulate in this case will be decided. The recent Appeals Court
decision affirmed the FCC’s ability to reverse its 2015 NN rules (see
Section 3.1).
Schulzrinne emphasizes that NN revolves around economic in-
centives. He argues for updated NN principles, namely (i) end-user
choice; (ii) economic neutrality and virtual structural separation;
and (iii) transparency [95]. Similarly, Misra et al. [74, 75, 81], argue
that the NN debate is primarily about economic incentives. The
authors propose a non-regulatory alternative, based on incentives,
to achieve the goals of NN.
An essential requirement for the effective enforcement of NN
rules is the availability of appropriate tools that enable the reliable
detection and subsequent sanction of anti-competitive behavior
on the Internet (e.g., through the application of ex-post antitrust
policies). Appropriate transparency and disclosure mandates that
require ISPs as well as other relevant market players that have
an impact on the QoE to disclose their traffic management prac-
tices and/or advertise the performance of their public services will
prove important for successful NN management. Developing suit-
able measurement metrics and tools to detect and verify that policy
commitments are being met, however, is complex and represents
an open research challenge. Making progress toward developing
better performance metrics, reporting and assessment capabilities
will require cross-disciplinary, multi-stakeholder collaboration in-
volving network operators, equipment vendors, edge providers of
content and applications, as well as third-party analysts, end-users
and policymakers.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper provides an introduction to why the NN debate is com-
plex and contentious. It also explains why engineers need to be
informed and contribute to the debate to ensure they can stay on
the right side of the law and help make sure the law (and future poli-
cies) stay on the right side of sound network engineering practice.
The paper has further elucidated that answering relevant questions
inherently and fundamentally requires an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive. What needs to be considered is that insufficiently informed
and thus, ill-defined regulatory interventions based on an outdated
mental model of the Internet will distort investment incentives and
harm innovation.
Even though some readers may find it unsatisfactory, the recog-
nition of the complexity of the issues at hand, and how they have
(not) been effectively resolved, renders it likely that NN will remain
an on-going subject for fierce debate. Importantly, we should not
expect network engineers or policymakers to agree on what the
best strategies are to preserve an open and innovative Internet, or
even what such a goal really ought to mean. Traffic management
and the networking capabilities and infrastructure that enables
and applications that necessitates it are continuing to evolve and
fuel the debate about the sustainability of the current and future
Internet.
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